

12 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff, on
NSCIC Working Group Matters and Related Concerns

1. I met with Andy today at his office for approximately an hour and a half at his request.
2. Andy asked whether I considered it would be worthwhile for him to forward his memorandum commenting on the summary of interviews he had conducted with NSC Staff members on their reactions to intelligence products. I suggested he do so. He said the DCI has both a set of the original interviews and Andy's summary and that both General Allen and General Graham have copies of the summary. I told him Bronson Tweedy had passed his copy of the summary to the DCI (Mr. Helms) and there had been no dissemination of it in the IC staff.
3. Andy commented at length on the three crisis case studies which had been prepared for the NSCIC Working Group. He felt the India-Pakistan and [redacted] studies were quite good but that the Arab-Israeli ceasefire study did not really get at the issues. He feels none of the studies really addresses two problem areas which are of concern to policy levels of government.
 - a. First, he feels there is a lack of shared perception as to how policy makers view the world and particularly the role of force in that world.
 - b. Second, he considers the total exclusion of intelligence from participation in the planning process during crisis situations is a distinct handicap. He believes intelligence should have something to offer during the period when policy is being designed, in monitoring the on-going situation, and in providing a feed-back of the effectiveness of actions called for by policy decisions, but intelligence does not really contribute in these areas.
4. During the crisis periods which were studied, the DCI had access to what was going on, in Andy's view, but there is no indication that he felt he could advise intelligence producers concerning what he learned while attending WSAG meetings and similar conferences.

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5. Two other problem areas in which Andy felt the study task groups did not dig deeply enough were:

a. The communications area, which was particularly difficult because studies were done after the fact. It was not possible to determine how some important documents reached top level people, if they did.

b. The use of third party intelligence. Andy considers the study groups did not even address this problem adequately. He considers detailed descriptions of actions and problem areas are necessary to get at the true nature of the problem here and he suggests that case studies should be made directly addressing the matter of the use of third party intelligence. Such studies should explore the extent to which problems relating to collection and to substantive interpretation exist. Unless the U.S. knows the source of third party information, it is difficult to know what confidence to have in the information. Any study of third party intelligence should investigate the variety of kinds of contacts the United States has since some third parties are virtually contract agents for the U.S. and others are fiercely independent.

6. Andy would like to see the NSCIC become active in providing guidance, but in order to make this possible the NSCIC Working Group needs a more active program. He feels the pace of studies to date has been very poor, and there is a need to motivate the Working Group members. Andy intends to send a memo to Dr. Kissinger before the end of the month, asking what Dr. Kissinger wants to see done concerning the NSCIC. Andy expects to include several specific action proposals in his memo.

7. Andy again expressed his unhappiness at the quality of the analysis represented in the crisis studies. He continues to believe that the intelligence officers involved in the studies did not dig into the real issues. He considers that one reason for this is that the intelligence community does not get intimately in crisis situations and does not maintain the kind of records which make it possible to go back after the fact and determine what really happened.

8. Andy talked at some length about differences between the view which intelligence officers seem to have and that of policy level officials of the role of force and the deployment of military forces as levers to influence crisis situations. He felt this was clearly evident in the deployment of naval forces to the Bay of Bengal in the India-Pakistan war. The United States used these moves as a way

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of communicating U.S. intent and concern, but the intelligence community, particularly State and CIA, seemed to have the view that such moves were inherently ineffective or should not be done and, therefore, intelligence did not contribute as it should have in assessing the results. Andy said also that Dr. Kissinger's request for an estimate of the consequences of particular outcomes of the India-Pakistan crisis got poor reply which did not deal with his concerns.

9. Andy said he had sent me a memo of the [] situation for distribution to Working Group members and wondered if comments had been received from anyone else. I told him this was the first and I had no indication anyone else has prepared any comments.

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